Abstract: In wireless mobile networks, a client can move between different locations while staying connected to the network and access the remote server over the mobile networks by using their mobile devices at anytime and anywhere. However, the wireless network is more prone to some security attacks, as it does not have the ingrained physical security like wired networks. Thus, the client authentication is required while accessing the remote server through wireless network. Based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) and identity-based cryptography (IBC), Debiao et al. proposed an ID-based client authentication with key agreement scheme to reduce the computation and communication loads on the mobile devices. The scheme is suitable for mobile client-server environments, is secure against different attacks and provides mutual authentication with session key agreement between a client and the remote server as they claimed. Unfortunately, this paper demonstrates that Debiao et al.'s scheme is vulnerable some cryptographic attacks, and proposed an improved ID-based client authentication with key agreement scheme using ECC. The proposed scheme is secure based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and Computational DiffieHelmann Problem (CDHP). The detail analysis shows that our scheme overcomes the drawbacks of Debiao et al.'s scheme and achieves more functionality for the client authentication with lesser computational cost than other schemes.
Introduction
In wireless environments, the mutual authentication between the mobile clients and the remote server gains popularity due to the rapid development of mobile communication and easy portability of handheld mobile devices such as smart phone, PDA, notebook PC etc. In recent years, the numbers of mobile client increases exponentially and at any time and any place, the people are more interested for online transaction using their mobile devices. However, the wireless mobile networks do not have the ingrained physical security like wired networks. Thus, an efficient and secure authentication technique for mobile client is required in order to provide the flexibility and robustness of online transaction. The authentication of the server and the client both are equally important when a client wants to acquire various services from the remote server to protect server's spoofing attack and impersonation attack from the outsiders. Some schemes although proposed for remote client mutual authentication, they are not usable in some applications such as e-voting, online-order placement, pay-TV etc., where a session key agreement is also necessary for exchanging the confidential information between the server and the clients over an open network. The main contribution of this paper is that design of a secure and computational efficient mutual authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile client-server environments.
In order to offer the strong securities, earlier client authentication schemes are usually implemented by means of public key infrastructure (PKI) [1, 2] . However, the real application of PKI-based remote authentication scheme brings heavy management burden of public key and certificates. Besides, the computation cost of PKI-based remote authentication scheme is very high due to modular exponentiation, making it unsuitable for mobile environments since the mobile devices have low-power battery, low storage space and low computation ability. Recently, ECC [3, 4] -based public key cryptosystem has attracted a great attention due to its shorter length key such as 160 bit ECC-based key provides same level of security as of 1024 bit RSA-based key, low storage and faster computation. Thus, several ECC-based client authentication schemes [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] have been proposed by the researchers to reduce the computation and communication loads on mobile devices. Despite the suitability of ECC-based scheme for low-power mobile devices, ECC-based cryptosystem has some other limitations like PKI-based cryptosystem. It needs extra storage space to store clients' public keys and certificates. The client must have additional computation ability to verify the other's public key certificate.
In 1984, Shamir [16] introduce the notion of identity-based cryptography (IBC) in which client's public key is an easily computable function of his email address, physical IP address etc., where the corresponding private key is generated by binding the client's identity with the master secret key of the trusted authority, called private key generator (PKG). The client's private key is given using a secure channel and known to only client and PKG, but its legitimacy can be verified publicly. The IBC avoids the use of public key certificates, so it can save system resources and improve the system efficiency. Thus, IBC seems to be an alternative solution to the PKI-based cryptosystem. However, most of the IBC scheme suffers from the private key escrow problem since PKG knows the private key of the user and thus, a malicious PKG can easily impersonate any legitimate client and the present work has been carried out in the direction for the private key escrow problem. After Shamir's work, several ID-based schemes have been proposed, but Boneh and Franklin first proposed the scheme satisfying ID-based encryption scheme (IBE) [17] in 2001 using bilinear pairing [18, 19] over an elliptic curve group.
Related works
Recently, several ID-based client authentication schemes [5, [9] [10] [11] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] have been found in literature. However, these are vulnerable to various attacks such as replay attack [5, 11, 20, 21] , privileged-insider attack [14, [23] [24] [25] , impersonation attack [5, 9] , lost/stolen smartcard attack [23, 24] , known session-specific temporary information attack [5, 11, 12, 14, 25] , and many logged-in users' attack [5, 11, 12, 14, 25] . In addition, some of these schemes are faces from the problem of users' anonymity [5, 11, 14, 25] , perfect forward security [5, 9] and clock synchronization [9] [10] [11] 25] . In 2011, Debiao et al. [14] proposed an ID-based client authentication with key agreement scheme on ECC for mobile client-server environments. They claimed that their scheme provides remote mutual authentication and session key agreement with low computation cost and is secure against various attacks. However, [25] showed that Debiao's scheme cannot withstand the clock synchronization problem, many logged-in users' attack, known session-specific temporary information attack, impersonation attack, privilege-insider attack, incapable to provide users' anonymity and no provision for changing/updating the leaked private key. Thus, aforementioned problems inspired us to design an efficient and secure ID-based client authentication with key agreement scheme for mobile client-server environments.
Contribution and organization
In this paper, we propose an improved ID-based client authentication with key agreement scheme using ECC, which is secure under the CDHP and ECDLP. The proposed scheme removes the security pitfalls and weaknesses of Debiao et al.'s scheme while keeping the merits of earlier scheme, and protects other attacks as well. Compared with other works, our scheme is efficient and secure, and thus suitable for mobile client-server environments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief review of Debiao et al.'s scheme is given. Section 3 describes the weaknesses of Debiao et al.'s scheme. Section 4 presents the details of the proposed scheme. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is given in Section 5 and the Section 6 compares the proposed scheme with other works in terms of computation cost. Finally, some concluding remarks are made in the last section.
Review of Debiao et al.'s scheme
In this section, we briefly reviewed the Debiao et al.'s scheme proposed for clientserver environments. The scheme has three phases: system initialization phase, client registration phase and mutual authentication with key agreement phase. The Table 1 An elliptic curve defined on finite field Fp with prime order n.
An additive cyclic group of elliptic curve points on E p (a, b). P A base point of the group Gp(a, b) with order n.
Three secure one-way hash function (i.e. SHA-1).
M AC K (m)
Secure message authentication code of message m under the key K.
Private/public key pair of the server S, wherePS = xP .
The client.
Tab. 1. Notations used in Debiao's scheme
System initialization phase
In this phase, the remote server S generates the system parameters as follows.
(1). S chooses an elliptic curve equation
. S selects a base point P with the order n over E p (a, b).
. S selects x ∈ R Z * n (it means x randomly selected from Z * n ) as master key and computes public key as P S = xP .
(4). S chooses three secure and one-way hash functions H 1 (·), H 2 (·), H 3 (·) and a message authentication code M AC K (m). The server S keeps x in private and publishes{F p , E p , n, P, P S , H 1 (·), H 2 (·), H 3 (·), M AC K (m)}as system's parameter.
Client registration phase
(1). The client C i submits his identity ID C i to the remote server S for registration. (2) . S computes h C i = H 1 (ID C i ) and clients private key/public key pair
. C i validates his private/public key pair(D Ci , P Ci ) by checking whether the equa-
The Debiao et al.'s scheme uses two approaches to deliver the private key D Ci to the client C i . One is off-line approach, where S stores the identity ID Ci , the private key D Ci into a smartcard and returns it to C i . Therefore, to deliver the smartcard a secure channel is necessary; otherwise, someone can tamper the smartcard. Second, the on-line approach, where C i connects to S through Internet, then S may use the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) channel in the https mode to deliver the private key D Ci to C i . Note that, Debiao et al.'s scheme uses the secure channel in the registration phase, however, the scheme suffer from the private key escrow problem (here we call it as privilegedinsider attack) since the private key D Ci is completely known to S and of course its privileged-insider.
Mutual authentication with key agreement phase
This phase is executed by between a client C i and the server S for the mutual authentication and the agreement of common session key. Initially, C i sends a login request toS and then the server verifies the client's request. If it is valid,S returns a response message to C i , which helps C i to validate S. Subsequently, both the client and the server generate a common session key. The mutual authentication and the session key agreement phase is stated as follows:
, and sends the login message
(2). Upon receiving the login message
that is computed by using the key K. S rejects the request if the integrity check fails, otherwise, he chooses a number r S ∈ R Z * n , computes W = r S P , K S = r S M and the session key as
(3). On receiving the message M 2 , client C i validates the timestamp T S and the integrity of
Weaknesses of Debiao et al.'s scheme
This section shows that Debiao et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to privileged-insider attack [25, 13] , many logged in users' attack [11, 12, 25] , impersonation attack [5, 9, 13, 25, 29] and known session-specific temporary information attack [11, 12, [25] [26] [27] . Besides, the scheme has the problems of clock synchronization [11, 13, 25] and users' anonymity [11, 25] . In addition, Debiao et al.'s scheme has no provision for changing/updating leaked authentication key [11, 25] with previous identity. It means, if the authentication key is leaked accidentally, the client cannot get a new authentication key with the previous identity. The client has to choose new identity each time for fresh private key. Thus, Debiao et al.'s scheme is inefficient to offer flexibility of changing/updating the leaked private key.
Privileged-insider attack
The private key escrow problem is an inherent problem of the most of the identitybased cryptography (IBC) since its inception. In the setting of IBC, a third party (PKG) generates the private key and the assumption that PKG is fully trusted is a strong assumption, which is very crucial for real-life application. Therefore, a malicious PKG may impersonate any user by using client's private key since it is completely known to PKG. In this paper, we call this attack as privileged-insider attack [11-13, 15, 25] , which is now described here. Note that Debiao's scheme is based on IBC and thus, it has the similar problem since the remote server knows the private key of each client. In the registration phase, S computes the private key D C i and returns it to C i . Therefore, there is a chance to expose the private key D C i to the privileged-insider E of S. If E learns the private key D C i of C i during the registration phase, then E may of course successfully impersonate C i to login S by using D C i . Thus, Debiao et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to this kind of privileged-insider attack.
Many logged-in users' attack
It is always preferable that the remote server gives permission one person at a time to reach the account of a legitimate client. Otherwise, the inconsistency of information may occur while updating or accessing the information stored into the remote server. However, Debiao et al.'s scheme cannot protect the situation where more than one person can get access to the same account concurrently [11, 12] . Assume that if C i 's private key D Ci is leaked to more than one person then all who know the pair (ID C i , D Ci ), may attempt to use C i 's account at the same time by originating the individual login requests. Therefore, each adversary can get access to C i 's account simultaneously just by selecting a random number r C i ∈ R Z * n and executing the following the mutual authentication phase of Debiao et al.'s scheme, because all of them employed the same authentication process using C i 's valid private key D Ci . The server S is unable to stop all of them to get access to C i 's account concurrently. Thus, the many logged-in users' attack with same login-id and leaked private key [11, 25, 12, 15] is possible in Debiao et al.'s scheme.
Impersonation attack
In general, the server stores minimal information about each client in the database based upon which the server verifies the legitimacy of clients during mutual authentication phase, but Debiao et al.'s scheme does not store any information about the clients. Suppose an adversary E steals the identity ID C i of an authorized client C i and asks for the private key to S corresponding to ID C i . Then S returns the private key
which is nothing but the private key of C i . Therefore, E can attack the authentication system by impersonating [5, 9, 13, 25 ] the client C i easily and can get access to the remote server S using client's private key D Ci .
Known session-specific temporary information attack
Canetti and Krawczyk [26] investigated the known session-specific temporary information attack in 2001. Later on, Cheng et al. [27] pointed out that the secrecy of the generated session key should not be affected even if the session ephemeral secrets are leaked to an adversary anyway. We can show that Debiao's scheme fails to protect this kind of attack. In mutual authentication phase, the client C i and the server S generate the common session key
are public information other than K S , and the security of the session key SK depends only on the confidentiality of K S = r S r C i P . According to [26, 27] , if the session ephemeral secrets r C i and r S are exposed to an outsider, then he can compute K S easily and the resulting session key SK as well. Thus, the Debiao et al.'s scheme is not secure against the known session-specific temporary information attack [11, 12, 25] .
Inability to protect users' anonymity
The police and security of mobile services allow the client to be anonymous while doing the transaction over the public channel. In some applications such as e-voting, secret online-order placement, online-shopping, pay-TV, etc., it is important to maintain the user secrecy, because from the identity ID C i some personal secret information may be leaked about the client C i or without employing any effort an adversary recognizes the particular transaction being performed by the client C i [11] . Therefore, a well sound remote login scheme should preserve the user anonymity in all respects.
However, Debiao et al.'s scheme does not preserve the users' anonymity [25] . In mutual authentication phase, C i 's original identity ID C i is transmitted with the message
} through the public network. Therefore, an adversary can identify the client who is trying to login the remote server.
3.6. No provision for changing/updating leaked private key Debiao et al.'s client authentication scheme does not offer the revocation of leaked private key with old identity [25] that is, if the authentication key is leaked to an outsider however, the server cannot compute new authentication key different from previous key with the same identity. Note that, for real-life applications, clients are interested to change their private key while keeping the identity same. In the registration phase, the private key D Ci = (x + H 1 (ID C i )) −1 P of the client C i is generated using the identity ID C i and the server's secret key x. This shows the uniqueness of the authentication key depends on the identity only. Therefore, the client has to choose dissimilar identity every time to get distinct authentication key. Therefore, Debiao's scheme does not have flexibility for changing/updating the leaked private key with same identity [11] .
Clock synchronization problem
In any mutual authentication scheme, timestamp is used to prevent the replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. However, the timestamp raises the problem of clock synchronization [11, 25] in large networks, such as wide area networks, mobile communication networks, and satellite communication networks. The schemes based on the timestamp can withstand the replay attack using systems' timestamp provided the system clock must be synchronized; otherwise, the scheme will not work properly. Since network environment and transmission delay is unpredictable [28] , a potential replay attack exists in all schemes that use the timestamp. The Debiao et al.'s is based on timestamp, so it faces the problem of clock synchronization.
Proposed scheme
This section proposes an improved ID-based client authentication with key agreement protocol based on ECC for mobile client-server environments. Similar to Debaio et al.'s scheme, two entities are involved in our scheme, namely a client C i and the remote server S. The proposed scheme consists of four phases: system initialization phase, client registration phase, mutual authentication with key agreement phase and changing/updating the leaked private key phase. We explain the proposed scheme by the following steps.
System initialization phase
The remote server S, to setup the overall system parameters executes this phase once. In this phase, given a security parameter k ∈ Z + , the server S generates the following system parameters.
(
1). S chooses an elliptic curve group G p (a, b).
(2). S selects a base point P with the order n over G p (a, b).
. S selects its master key x ∈ R Z * n and computes public key P S = xP . (4). S chooses three secure one-way hash functions H 1 (·), H 2 (·), H 3 (·) . The serverS keeps x in private and publishes {F p , G p (a, b) , n, P, P S , H 1 (·), H 2 (·), H 3 (·)}.
Client registration phase
This phase is executed once for registration by the client C i before login the remote server S to obtain his authentication key, which is used to verify the identity of the client or the remote server. The steps of this phase are given as follows.
(1). The client C i chooses a number
(2). S checks the uniqueness of the identity ID C i . If the identity is not unique, S requests C i to submit another fresh identity. Otherwise, S checks the registration details and computes the private/public key pair for C i .
. S chooses a number + t C i and checks the validity of the private/public keys by the equation
If the above verification is satisfied then the private key ( D C i , V C i ) and the public key P C i are valid. After validating the tuple (
into his mobile device. The detailed description of the registration phase is given in Fig. 1 . 
n is unknown to him. Here, t C i is only known to C i and hence, the private key D C i is unknown to S. Therefore, any privileged-insider of S cannot impersonate C i and as a result, the proposed scheme removes the privileged-insider attack (key-escrow problem).
Mutual authentication with key agreement phase
In this phase, both the client C i and the server S mutually authenticate each other using clients' mobile device, and then generate a common session key. The proposed client authentication scheme is based on the three-way challenge-response handshake technique instead of two-way challenge-response technique as used in Debaio et al.'s scheme.
(1). The client C i keys his identity ID C i and the private key D C i into the mobile device and then the device checks whether P C i = D C i P holds. If it is invalid, the mobile device asks the client for exact identity-private key pair, otherwise, chooses a number r C i ∈ R Z * n and then computes the followings: 
, W ) and checks whether the received H S is equal to computed H S . If the result is negative then C i rejects the transaction, otherwise authenticates the server S and computes the session key
After that, S accepts SK as the session key if the received H CS is equal to the computed H SC , otherwise, rejects the transaction.
It is to be noted that both S and C i mutually authenticates each other securely and hold the same session key SK. The client authentication with session key agreement phase also is shown in Fig. 2. 
Changing/updating the leaked private key with same identity
The proposed scheme has the flexibility of changing/updating the leaked private key with the old identity. Assume that the private key D C i of the client C i is leaked by some means to an adversary. Thus, to get a new private key with the same login-id, C i performs the following steps (See Fig. 3 .): 
Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we analyzed the proposed scheme, which can resist all attacks, and compares with other related schemes from security point of view. The proposed scheme Fig. 3 . Changing/updating the leaked private key with same identity of the proposed scheme not only eliminates the weaknesses of Debaio et al.'s scheme, but also resists all other attacks. Our scheme is secure provided that following two computational problems are infeasible on the elliptic curve group. Definition 1. Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP):
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP): Given (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G p for any a, b ∈ R Z * n computation of abP is hard in the group G p .
Many logged-in users' attack
The proposed scheme can protect the many logged-in users' attack. Assume that C i 's private key D C i is exposed to the outsiders A 1 and A 2 . Now A 1 and A 2 know (ID C i , D C i ) and thus, they can try to get access C i 's account to the server S concurrently. However, the proposed scheme allows one person at a time to get access to C i 's account. Suppose that A 1 gets logged in to S, then S sets the status-bit to 1 (one) and meanwhile if A 2 try to get login S, then the server S refuses A 2 's request since the status-bit indicates still someone is logged in. Thus, the proposed scheme is robust against many logged-in users' attack.
Known session-specific temporary information attack
The proposed scheme can withstand the known session-specific temporary information attack. According to [11, 12, 25] , the disclosure of the session short-term secrets r C i and r S in a session does not expose the session key of that session. In our scheme, the client C i and the remote server S mutually authenticate each other and then compute the session key SK = H 3 (ID C i , M, M , W, K) . If r C i and r S are exposed to an outsider E, then E can compute K = r C i r S P using r C i and r S , but he cannot compute M = D C i xP without the secret key of either the client or the server. The secret M can be computed directly from the pair (P C i , P S ) = (D C i P, xP ) if a polynomial-time algorithm solves the CDH problem. However, there is no such polynomial-time algorithm, which can break the CDH problem. Therefore, the proposed scheme can protect the known session-specific temporary information attack.
Lost/Stolen mobile device attack
In our scheme, client C i stores the information (ID C i , V C i , P C i ) into his mobile device, which can help both the clientC i and the server S for mutual authentication. Suppose an adversary E steals C i 's mobile device, extracts (ID C i , V C i , P C i ) from the device and then try to get login S by using the extracted information. However,
due to the difficulties of ECDLP problem. Therefore, E cannot get any valuable information from the stolen/lost mobile device that can help him to impersonate the client C i . Thus, the lost/stolen mobile device attack is infeasible to the proposed scheme.
Mutual authentication and session key agreement
The proposed scheme achieves the mutual authentication and secret session key agreement between a client and the remote server by means of three-way challenge-response handshake technique. In our scheme, the client C i sends the login request message
Then S verifies the received message M 1 by using the secret M ", which can be computed by the real server S and the legal client C i only. After validating M 1 , S sends a challenge message access to the resource of S. Thus, the proposed scheme supports a secure session key agreement and mutual authentication between a client and the remote server.
Users' anonymity problem
The proposed scheme offers users' anonymity [11] when any communication have been made by a user over the public networks. In our scheme, instead of C i 's original identity ID C i a dynamic identity
is sent from which an outsider E cannot obtain ID C i since M = r C i P is unknown to him. Noted that, E can compute M from M by executing M = x −1 M only if the secret key x of S is known. However, E has no knowledge about the secret key x. On the other hand, E also cannot derive the secret key x from public key P S = xP due to the hardness of ECDLP problem. Thus, the users' anonymity is preserved in our scheme.
Replay attack and clock synchronization problem
The proposed scheme does not employ the timestamp and thus, clock synchronization problem is removed. Besides, an outsider E cannot make a replay attack in our scheme.
Assume that E replays a previous session valid message
as well since he is unaware about the short-term secret r C i and the private key D C i . Therefore, E replies with the wrong message {H CS "} that can be detected by the server S by comparing it with the computed H SC = H 2 (ID C i , M, M , M ", W , SK ) and rejects E's login request.
Privileged-insider attack
The privileged-insider attack is not possible in the proposed scheme. In the registration phase, C i sends the tuple (ID C i , T C i ) to S and then S computes the partial private key as D *
+ t C i is unknown to S and its privileged-insider E (say), because t C i is only known to C i . To compute t C i from T C i = t C i P , E has to solve the ECDLP problem, which is hard to break by any polynomial time algorithm to date. Due to the incomplete knowledge of D C i , E cannot impersonate C i successfully and thus cannot access to get the remote server S.
Known session key security
The known session key security states that an outsider cannot compute the current session key even he knows some previous session keys. In our scheme, the session key SK = H 3 (ID C i , M, M , M ", W, K) is computed by using a one-way hash function on the session secrets. Due to the one-way property of hash function, an outsider cannot takeout (M, M ", K) from SK. Moreover, SK is distributed uniformly in {0, 1} k thus, each session has separate SK as it is depends on the short-term secrets r C i and r S , which are generated independently and both will be different in each session. Therefore, disclosure of some previous session keys does not expose the current session key.
Perfect forward secrecy
The property of perfect secrecy states that the compromise of the private keys of both the participating entities does not affect the security of the previous session keys. The proposed scheme supports the perfect forward security in all respects. Since, the client C i and the server S compute the session key
If C i 's private keys, or S's private key is compromised to an adversary E, then E can compute M ", but not K due to the difficulties of CDH problem. Thus, our scheme satisfies the perfect forward security.
No key control
In the proposed scheme, after mutual authentication, both C i and S compute the session key SK = H 3 (ID C i , M, M , M ", W, K)that depends on the ephemeral secrets r C i and r S contributed by C i and S. Therefore, neither S nor C i can force the session key SK to a pre-selected value or lies with in a set containing the small number of elements. Hence, our protocol satisfies the no key control property.
In order to analyze the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we list some of the security requirements and make comparisons of our scheme with other related schemes [5, 9, 14] in Table 2 , which shows that our scheme is more efficient than others and can be applicable in mobile client-server environments.
Comparison with other schemes
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme in terms computation cost with competitive schemes [5, 9, 14] . To estimate the computation cost of our scheme, we define the following notations: PM is the time complexity to execute elliptic curve scalar point multiplication, H is the time complexity to execute hash operation and X is the time complexity to execute XOR operation. It is to be noted that the XOR operation needs very few computations; it is usually neglected considering its computational cost. The computation cost of a scheme is defined by the time spent by the client and the server for registration phase and mutual authentication with session key agreement phase. The Yang-Chang scheme needs 9PM+9H, Debaio et al. needs 7PM+11H where as our scheme needs 7PM+7H+2X. Besides, our scheme avoids the problem of clock synchronization, and achieves users' anonymity as well, which requires two extra XOR operations. In addition, the proposed scheme can offer resilience against various attacks such as many logged-in users' attack, lost/stolen mobile device attack, impersonation attack, known session-specific temporary information attack, privileged-insider attack, replay attack, etc. We summarize the computation cost of our scheme and carried out a comparison with other schemes [5, 9, 14] in Table 3 , which shows that our scheme is efficient ID-based client authentication scheme for mobile client-server environments. 
Conclusions and future works
In this paper, we analyzed the Debaio et al.'s ID-based client authentication with session key agreement scheme and found that it is unable to resist privileged-insider attack, many logged in users' attack, impersonation attack and known session-specific temporary information attack. Besides, their scheme does not provide users' anonymity and the leaked key revocation phase with the previous identity. In addition, Debaio et al.'s scheme has the problem of clock synchronization. As a remedy, we proposed an improved ID-based client authentication with session key agreement scheme for mobile client-server environments using elliptic curve cryptosystem. The rigorous analysis of security and efficiency of the proposed scheme has been made, which shows that our scheme resists more attacks than the Debaio et al.'s scheme with lesser computational overheads.
An improved dynamic identity-based remote user mutual authentication with session key agreement scheme for mobile client-server environments is proposed. It can be noted that, our scheme is secured against all possible attacks known; however, the security analysis of it in a computational model like random oracle model may be carried out to have provable security features.
